|Title||On the empirical evaluation of Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions|
|Year of Publication||2007|
|Authors||Vinyals M, Cerquides J, Rodríguez-Aguilar JA|
Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions (MMUCA) allow agents to bid for bundles of goods to buy, goods to sell, and transformations of goods. In particular, MMUCAs offer a high potential to be employed for the automated assembly of supply chains of agents offering goods and services, and in general the MMUCA extends and generalises all the preceding types of combinatorial auctions. However, little is known about their practical application since no empirical results have been reported on winner determination algorithms for MMUCAs. In this paper, we try to make headway on the practical application of MMUCAs by: (1) providing an algorithm to generate artificial data that is representative of the sort of scenarios a winner determination algorithm is likely to encounter; and (2) subsequently assessing the performance of an Integer Programming implementation of MMUCA on CPLEX.
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